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peditiously handled since all rights could be determined in the single
action.2 6 Moreover, there would be no real objection to the introduc-
tion of evidence of the financial condition of one defendant; its use
properly limited by instruction, so as to be applicable only to that
particular defendant in the assessment of exemplary damages. 27 Nor
would this separateness of compensatory and exemplary damages in-
volve any substantive changes requiring legislative action;28 instead,
it would be a step toward procedural efficiency, a matter properly
within the purview of judicial initiative.
JAMES V. LoUc.IIRAN, JR.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
OF A MINOR CHILD
In cases involving the wrongful death of a minor child, the proper
measure of damages recoverable has been the subject of much litiga-
tion. As yet, no legislativc or judicial formula has been evolved that
will assure an adequate recovery in every-case and at the same time
prevent excessive jury verdicts. Because damages for the wrongful
death of a human being are assessed according to the pecuniary value
tort-feasors ... have been guilty of different degrees of oppression, fraud, or
malice so as to justify a verdict or verdicts for exemplary damages ... and where
such damages ... are to be awarded 'for the sake of example and by way of punish-
ing' each particular defendant according to the measure of his offending, juries
should be allowed so to admeasure and apportion such exemplary damages as
to make the example as well as the punishment fit the offense." Thomson v. Cata-
lina. 205 Cal. 402, 27, Pac. 198, 200 (19a8).
'Davis v. Hearst, supra note 24 at 542.
-7The defendants are still jointly and severally liable for compensatory
damages, but are liable only severally for the amount of exemplary damages
assessed against them individually.
n"Either it must be placed within the province of the jury to find separate
verdicts, or the rule permitting the consideration of evidence of the wealth of the
defendants must go out of the issue of punitive damage. There is no middle ground
between these two propositions. Having to decide between such alternatives, we
cannot doubt that the policy of allowing separate verdicts is preferable. The rule
of one verdict against all the defendants found guilty will almost always cause the
entire punishment to fall upon one alone. The other defendants will then be
freed and discharged from liability on the judgment, thus being enabled, notwith-
standing the 'example' of the verdict 'for the public good,' to wholly evade the
penalty and defeat altogether the ends of justice. The policy of separate verdicts,
on the other hand, requires that, in fixing the amount of punitive damages, the pe-
cuniary conditions of the defendants should be considered." Johnson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 142 S.C. 125, 14o S.E. 443, 454-55 (1927). Contra, McAllister v.
Kimberly-Clark Co., 169 Wis. 473, 173 N.W. 216 (ig): "We have no inclination,
even if we had power so to do, to establish by decision any such innovation in
favor of this element of damage." 173 N.W. at 217.
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of that person, the problem usually facing the court is to find a basis
for sustaining any recovery in the case of a child's wrongful death
since the child has no substantial earning capacity.'
The case of Blisard v. Vargo2 presents the situation in which the
child's future earning capacity, instead of being speculative, was ade-
quately assured and substantial. In an action brought under the
Pennsylvania wrdngful death and survival statutes, the United States
District Court held that an award of $50,000 in the survival action for
the estate of an eight-and-a-half year old boy was not excessive. The
boy had the prospect of almost certain employment in a prosperous
and growing textile business owned by his family in which his
father had an influential position. In denying a motion for a new
trial the court said:
"Assuming that the father's average earnings from the business
would be $14,ooo a year (a very conservative figure in light of
his earnihgs during the last three years), and assuming, not
unreasonably, in light of the continuous inflation to which we
are all subject, that the son's average annual earnings would
be the same, those earnings for the 47 years of his expectancy
would amount to $658,ooo. This amount, decreased by the
expenses of his maintenance, and reduced to present value,
could very well leave a balance of $5o, ooo."3
This holding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
4
The result in the principal case is a product of a long evolution
in the field of tort law. The death of a human being was not the
ground of an action within the concept of "modern"5 common law.6
'For a discussion showing that a child uses more money than he makes during
minority, see Dublin and Lotka, The Money Value of a Man (Rev. 1946). This re-
port shows that the cost of bringing up a child to age 18 in families with an annual
income of $2,500 totals $7,425; and when the family income is $5,000 to $So,ooo it
totals $2o,785. Since this was th- result of a 1936 survey, it can be assumed that
costs would be substantially higher today.
2286 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1961), affirming 185 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Pa. 196o).
185 F. Supp. at 75.
'Blisard v. Vargo, 286 F.2d 169 (3 d Cir. 1961).
'Before the Norman Conquest, a system of fixed monetary awards against a
slayer for the benefit of the kinsmen of the slain was in effect among the Anglo-
Saxons. The payment was known as "wergild." This system, which was largely
punitive in purpose, disappeared when the government began to punish murder
as a crime. i Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 25 (1895).
'Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209 (1924); The Harrisburg, 9ig U.S. 199
(1886); Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Pickett v. Matthews,
238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939); Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo.
672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933); Stevenson v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., io8 Va. 575, 62
S.E. 351 (i9o8). See also Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § i (2d ed. 1913); 25
C.J.S. Death § 13 (1941).
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This was true because of two notions: Firstly, the right of action ac-
cruing to the person before his death abated at the death of the
person injured; although the cause of action continued in theory,
there was no one capable of asserting it.7 Secondly, the common law
did not recognize a separate and distinct cause of action accruing to
the relatives of the injured personss
The injustice of these highly artificial conceptions was recognized
in England with the adoption in 1846 of Lord Campbell's Act,9 which
established a new cause of action for certain designated beneficiaries
for the wrongful death of the decedent. An alternative remedy is
provided by the "survival acts"'1 which in their simplest form pro-
vide that personal actions shall not abate on the death of the wronged
person but shall survive. This is commonly thought of as the cause
of action in the estate of the deceased, to be brought by the executor
or administrator. When the person supporting a family is killed,
an adequate measure of damages can be based on such items as his
life expectancy, past earnings, prospective future earnings and con-
tributions to the family." To assure a complete recovery when a
person is wrongfully killed, a number of states, including the jurisdic-
tion in the principal case,12 have enacted both Lord Campbell and
survival type statutes. 3
The application of both statutes seems unrealistic when the de-
cedent is a minor child. In such a case the beneficiaries under the
wrongful death statute are usually the, ultimate heirs of the estate
under the survival statutes, i.e., the parents. The reasons for separat-
ing these two classes of action for the same wrong do not exist in the
case of the death of a minor because the child normally leaves no large
debts, so that there are no creditors who need to be protected by the
separate cause of action for the estate, and the child leaves no real
dependents of the class a Lord Campbell type statute is designed to
-Cummins v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (933). See
also McCormick, Damages § 93 (1935); Schumaher, Rights of Action Under Death
and Survival Statutes, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 114 (1925).
8Ibid.
09 & 1O Vict. c. 93 (1846). See Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334
Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933).
"Porpora v. City of New Haven, 122 Conn. 8o. 187 At. 668 (1936); Rasmussen
v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937).
"McCormick, Damages § 99 (1935).
'-The death action is provided by Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 16oi (1960). The
survival action is provided by Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1960).
"Wright v. Smith, 136 Kan. 205, 14 P.2d 640 (1932); Micks v. Norton, 256
Mich. 308, 239 N.W. 512 (1931); Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W.
674 (1937). For a listing of other cases see Note, 44 Hav. L. Rev. 980 (1931).
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protect. In such cases, therefore, it seems desirable to have only one
"death action" in favor of the parents.
Assuming that a wrongful death statute is held to be applicable
in the death of a minor, what is the proper measure of damages? For
purposes of analysis, the cases dealing with this subject can be broken
down into two general classifications: (i) those which allow a recovery
based on the present value of services and contributions the child
might reasonably be expected to render to his parents before, as well
as after, majority; and (2) those which limit recovery to the present
value of the services the child owes the parents until he comes of age.
Because there is very little economic productivity during childhood
and restricting the period to the child's minority thereby limits the
recovery, a substantial number of jurisdictions adhere to the first view,
allowing a recovery based on the full life expectancy of the decedent
child.14 These courts feel that this longer period more reasonably
justifies a 1arger recovery, and consequently there is less compulsion
to set aside such a verdict as excessive. In jurisdictions where the full
life expectancy approach is used, various judicial or legislative limi-
tations evolved to limit the recovery. Courts following this view
may allow a deduction for the expense of providing for the child if he
had lived; limit the period of recovery to the life expectancy of the
parents; or require that the jury be satisfied by proof of the probabil-
ity of actual loss.15 Wilscam v. United States,'6 a leading case for
the full life view, allowed the parents to recover for the wrongful
death of their four-year-old child based on a reasonable expectation
of pecuniary benefit extending over the entire life expectancy of the
child. In sustaining an $11,46o award, the court said:
"[T]he law does not make the question of damages in a case
of this description turn upon the earning capacity of the minor.
Indeed, the rule that parents are entitled to a minor's earn-
ings is archaic and a remnant of times long since past. It does
not accord with modern views of the parent-child relation-
ship."17
Because the full life view places few limitations upon jury specu-
lation and allows them to guess at the employment the decedent would
1
'Bond v. United Railways, 159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366 (1911); U.S. Brewing Co.
v. Stoltenberg, 211 II. 531, 7P N.E. io8i (19o4); Dorsey v. Yost, 151 Neb. 66, 36
N.W.2d 574 (1949); Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 11o N.Y. 504, 18 N.E. io8
(1888). See McCormick, Damages § 1o (1935); 2 Sedgewick, Damages § 575 (9th
ed. 1920).
11Crawford v. Southern Ry. lO6 Ga. 87o, 33 S.E. 826 (1899); Dorsey v. Yost,
151 Neb. 66, 36 N.W.2d 574 (1949).
676 F. Supp. 581 (D. Hawaii 1948).
1"Id. at 586.
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have chosen when grown, a substantial number of jurisdictions follow
the second view and limit recovery to the value of the child's services
during minority.18 The basis of this approach is that it is only during
the child's minority that the parent has any legal claim to the child's
services. 19 In Luessen v. Oshkosh Elec. Light & Power Co.,20 it was
stated:
"The surviving father here was entitled, as a matter of right,
to the services of his son. As between him and the wrongdoers,
the latter has deprived him of that right."
21
Despite the criticism leveled at this "entitlement to earnings" rationali-
zation,22 there is added justification for this approach because it is
the exception rather than the rule for a child, after majority, to con-
tribute substantially to the support of his parents.
Those jurisdictions which allow recovery after the period of minor-
ity and those which limit recovery to the period before the decedent's
majority usually arrive at different conclusions because of differences
in the statutory conditions under which they are rendered.23 To limit
recoveries a number of states, including Virginia, 24 have statutory
ceilings which apply in all cases involving wrongful death.25 The
Columbia University Committee to Study Compensation for Auto-
mobile Acddents has suggested that a scale of maximum and minimum
recoveries for death cases resulting from automobile accidents be
established by law.20 The Committee recommended that for the
2,Morel v. Lee, 182 Ark. 985, 33 S.V.2d 111o (1930); Thompson v. Town of
Fort Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440, (1931): Cooper v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.,
66 Mich. 261, 33 N.WN. 306 (1887).
"Augusta Factory v. Davis, 87 Ga. 648, 13 S.E. 577 (1891); Stevenson v. WV. M.
Ritter Lumber Co., xo8 Va. 575, 62 S.E. 351 (19o8). See 25 C.J.S. Death § 103 (1941).
lO9 Wis. 94, 85 N.W. 124 (19o1).
1Id. at 126.
fSee note 17 supra.
"In all cases, since the right of recovery is wholly statutory, the action must
stand or fall by the terms of the statute under which recovery is sought. There can
be no recovery in cases which do not come within the provisions of the statute.
Bond v. United Railways, 159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366 (igii); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d
488 (195o; 2 Sedgewick, Damages § 5 7 1(b) (9 th ed. 192o ) .2'Va. Code Ann. § 8-636 (Supp. 1960).
-"he recent trend, however, has been either to raise or abolish this limit. An
example is Virginia where the maximum recovery was raised from $15,ooo to
$25,000 in 1952 and where it was increased again in 1958 to $3o,ooo. For other
examples see McCormick, Damages § 104 (1935); 2 Sedgwick, damages § 571(a)
(9th ed. 1920).
nReport by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents
to Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences at 142 (1932),
cited in McCormick, Damages § i6 at 365 n-37 (1935).
i96i]
282 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
death of unemployed children under 20 years of age the surviving
parents should receive a minimum of $50o and a maximum of $2,500.27
In a recent case 2s which appears to take a realistic approach in
finding an equitable means to compensate the parents of a deceased
child, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that damages for parental
grief, pain and suffering may be awarded by a jury.29 An award of
$5,5oo for the parent for the negligent death of a three-year-old daugh-
ter was sustained with the following comment:
"[R]ecovery in a case like this should be reasonable recompense
for parental pain and suffering including fair compensation for
services that might reasonably be expected the child would
render the parents from the date of the accident to the date
of its majority."3 0
Because damages are not ordinarily recoverable in death actions for
the mental anguish, suffering or bereavement of the surviving rela-
tives,31 this approach goes to the heart of the issue and recognizes
that the death of a child results in the loss of love, affection and
solace-not money. Where the courts frankly admit they are allowing
recovery for parental grief caused by death, recoveries tend to be more
realistic.
3 2
Therefore, the preferable rule would appear to be one which pro-
vides a separate standard in cases of the wrongful death of a minor
with recovery based on the direct pecuniary loss which the parent can
sufficiently prove coupled with considerations of parental grief.
WILLIAM CHARLES MILLER
2Ibid.
'Winner v. Sharp, 43 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1949).
'This was based on a Florida statute, Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws, 1941, art. 768.o3.
Apparently Florida is the only state which, by express provision of a statute, makes
parental mental pain and suffering caused by the wrongful death of their minor
child an element of damages. Note, 2 Baylor L. Rev. 35o at 352 (195o).
3'Winner v. Sharp, 43 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1949).
"Groom v. Murphy, 179 N.C. 393, 102 S.E. 706 (1920); Sutherland v. State, 189
Misc. 953, 68 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Cl. 1947). See 74 A.L.R. 64 for a compilation of states
and cases. See also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 1o4 (i94t); Note, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 409 at
411 (1931)-
"'See Note, 2 Baylor L. Rev. 350, 355 (i95o) for a comparison between Florida
and Texas judgments in such cases. Texas does not allow recovery for the pamn
and suffering of parents.
